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RwandaWe evaluate the short-term impact of a pilot land regularization program in Rwanda using a geographic discon-
tinuity design with spatial ﬁxed effects. Three key ﬁndings emerge from the analysis. First, the program seems to
have improved land access for legally married women (about 76% of married couples) and prompted better
recording of inheritance rights without gender bias. Second, we ﬁnd that the program was associated with a
very large impact on investment and maintenance of soil conservation measures. This effect was particularly
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insecurity which the program managed to reduce. Third, land market activity declined, allowing us to reject
the hypothesis that the programcaused awave of distress sales orwidespread landlessness by vulnerable people.
Implications for program design and policy are discussed.
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While Africa has beenhistorically rather land abundant, three factors
have focused attention on land rights and the way in which they are
managed. First, a combination of population growth, soil degradation,
urban expansion, exacerbated more recently by a ‘rush’ for land to ben-
eﬁt from rising global demand for agricultural commodities and envi-
ronmental services, increased pressures on land. Second, even land
currently cultivated is characterized by enormous productivity gaps;
recent studies show that no African country except South Africa
achieves even 25% of the potential (Deininger et al., 2011). The invest-
ments needed to bridge this gap are unlikely to be forthcomingwithout
secure rights. Third, structural transformation from an agrarian to a
manufacturing- and service-based economywill require shifts of popu-
lation and transfers of land to other producers for which markets arelopment, the Global Land Tools
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ights reserved.likely to be the most efﬁcient mechanism. While land registration can,
in principle, contribute to these objectives, limited success and sustain-
ability of such programs in the past led many observers to believe that
interventions of this nature have limited beneﬁts and will be too
complex and risky to undertake.
With land widely considered to having been a signiﬁcant contributor
to the 1994 Genocide, Rwanda's government has emphasized the
importance of clarifying land rights to avoid conﬂict and promote struc-
tural transformation. This has led to far-reaching legal measures to
address a history of often land-related conﬂict and tribal division, end
gender discrimination in land access, and provide a framework to make
optimum use of available land resources to contribute to social and eco-
nomic development. The country also launched a program of land tenure
regularization (LTR) that is one of the most low-cost and ambitious
(in scope) interventions of this nature. Assessing the impact of this pro-
gram is of interest in three respects. First, with increasing demand for
land, many African countries are looking for low-cost options to clarify
land tenure, a topic that has been discussed in the literature largely
from other regions (Deininger and Feder, 2009). Second, how land issues
are resolvedwill affect social norms in other areas such as gender equality
and resource access, so that evaluating the impact of interventions in this
area can provide broader insights (Aldashev et al., 2012). Third, in terms
of assessing themore narrow returns to the land title registration process,
it is of interest to see if land title registration leads to changes in invest-
ment and related markets such as the use of credit.
In this paper, we assess the impact of the (rural) pilots that preceded
the national roll-out of Rwanda's LTR program. Outcome variables
considered are the incidence of land-related investment, female land
ownership and inheritance, the frequency of land transactions, and
credit access. We ﬁnd that pilot participants doubled their investment
Fig. 1. Location of trial areas.
As cellswouldbe too small to identify on themap,wemarked sectors, noting that in the case of the EasternRegion, the trial cell is located in the country's interior so thatwehave treatment
and control households along the entire cell boundary.
263D.A. Ali et al. / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 262–275in soil conservation, with a larger increase for females. Formalization
appears to have increased tenure security by legally married women –
though not for women who are not formally married – and clariﬁed
future inheritance. One notable exception is that of female headed
households who preferred to follow tradition in explicit contravention
of the law.We ﬁndno evidence of LTR-induced credit-effects, consistent
with the fact that the pilot had not yet led to the establishment of a func-
tioning registry. There was also no indication of increased land market
activity, making it unlikely that the program contributed to distress
sales or increased landlessness.
These ﬁndings have implications for programs in this area. Beneﬁts
from land regularization aremost likely in termsof female empowerment
and investment, especially if tenure insecurity had been high before the
program and the underlying legal framework makes provisions for
women's equality in land ownership. Impacts on the operation of land
markets and credit access will take longer tomaterialize or be contingent
on complementarymeasures such as registries. In the case of Rwanda, en-
suring full realization and sustainability of potential beneﬁts from land
tenure regularization emerging from our analysis in a nation-wide roll-
out will require addressing areas where policy is unclear, ambiguous, or
at variancewith practice on the ground. The paper is organized as follows.
Section two places the topic in context and identiﬁes areas that warrantTable 1
Distribution of sampled households by program participation.
Province District Sector Pop. density Number of sampled households
Pers./km2 Treatment Control (adjacent cells)
West Karongi Ruganda 337 125 245
North Musanze Rwaza 769 465 694
Kigali City Gasabo Gatsata 3591 462 502
East Kirehe Mubama 274 404 657
Total number of households 1456 2098greater empirical attention by reviewing lessons from the literature
on land titling in Africa. Section three describes the challenges
confronted by Rwanda, the institutional changes made in response to
these, and relevant characteristics of the LTR program. The econometric
approach and sampling strategy are described in section four, followed
by a discussion of key results with respect to investment, women's
land rights, inheritance, and land market participation in section ﬁve.
We conclude with the implications for policy and follow-up research
in section six.
2. Background and conceptual framework
While issues of land tenure formalization in Africa have long been
the subject of debate, increased land scarcity and recent growth in de-
mand for land reinforce the importance of securing rights to allow
land-related investment that would close the productivity gap while
at the same time ensuring that increased land values beneﬁt local land
users rather than raising the specter of dispossession. A review of the
pros and cons of land titling interventions drawing on the conceptual
and empirical literature sets out the challenges which any program of
land tenure regularization will have to confront.
2.1. Conceptual framework
Establishment and maintenance of a property rights system is a
public good that affects outcomes through two main channels
(Besley and Ghatak, 2010). One is to lower the risk of land loss
which would increase investment incentives and reduce the need
to spend resources on protecting property. The second is the facilita-
tion of market transactions that allow efﬁciency-enhancing transfers
of land to productive users and its use as collateral in ﬁnancial
markets. In addition, the way in which land ownership is assigned
Sample Design
Kabushenge cell boundary
Inside band
Outside band
Adjacent cells boundary
Treatment sample residence
Control sample residence
0 400 800 1,200 1,600200
Meters
N
Fig. 2. Example of sample design: Kabushinge cell.
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power within the household.
Historically, land rights emerge at the transition to sedentary agri-
culture to encourage investment, in the form of land clearing or estab-
lishment of perennials (Binswanger et al., 1995; Boserup, 1965).
Rights acquired in this way are normally very secure (Besley, 1995)
and institutional innovations to increase tenure security often arose
endogenously as beneﬁts to investment increased (Brasselle et al.,
2002; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994; Otsuka, 2001). Differences in
tenure security across groups can have far-reaching implications for
productivity of land use and increases in population density can greatlyTable 2
Comparison of treatment and control cells.
Source: Own computation from 2010World Bank Land Tenure Regularization Survey.
Total
Enforcement of government policy
Polygamously married femalesa 0.13
Grade 1 (ages 6 and 7) 0.838
Grade 2 (ages 7 and 8) 0.770
Grade 3 (ages 8 and 9) 0.490
Grade 4 (ages 9 and 10) 0.385
Grade 5 (ages 10 and 11) 0.267
Legal knowledge
Surviving spouse will administer land 0.72
The land to be divided equally among children 0.91
Wife's written consent for leasing land 0.95
Fertile land that is left fallow for 3 years will be taken by government 0.17
DLC approval needed for expropriation 0.21
No relocation unless compensation is paid 0.61
Note: signiﬁcance levels are for t-tests of the equality of the means for each of the variables be
a As polygamy was outlawed only in 1999, only females married after the 1999 law are con
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.increase pressure on land. In Ghana, for example, security of women's
rights varied by social status and affected investment via fallowing,
leading to signiﬁcant productivity losses (Goldstein and Udry, 2008).
Women also have difﬁculty holding on to land in case of divorce or
death of their husband (Deininger and Castagnini, 2006). In many
West African settings, laws and practice limit tenure security by
migrants and non-nationals even if they have long-established use
rights (Colin and Ayouz, 2006), reducing productivity (Fenske,
2010, 2011). Protecting land rights will be particularly important in
settings where increasing land values may create an incentive for
authorities that were to act custodians of vital community assets toTreatment Control t-Test N
0.14 0.12 669
0.828 0.844 1040
0.756 0.780 1030
0.520 0.470 874
0.400 0.373 1006
0.292 0.249 974
0.69 0.74 ⁎⁎⁎ 2487
0.91 0.91 2485
0.94 0.95 2496
0.17 0.17 2496
0.19 0.22 ⁎ 2491
0.55 0.64 ⁎⁎⁎ 2491
tween control and treatment areas.
sidered.
Table 3
Household and parcel level descriptive statistics by treatment status.
Source: Own computation from 2010World Bank Land Tenure Regularization Survey.
Total Control Treatment
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Household characteristics
Head's age 45.317 15.392 45.533 15.578 44.980 15.099
Married couple 0.711 0.454 0.707 0.455 0.717 0.451
With legal marriage certiﬁcate 0.764 0.425 0.752 0.432 0.782 0.414
Female headed household 0.224 0.417 0.239 0.426 0.201 0.401⁎⁎
Head has at least primary education 0.326 0.469 0.320 0.467 0.335 0.472
Head reads and writes 0.617 0.486 0.611 0.488 0.628 0.484
Number of male children age 14 and less 0.900 1.044 0.899 1.045 0.902 1.044
No. of female children age 14 and less 0.899 1.031 0.909 1.044 0.884 1.011
Number of adult male age 15 to 60 1.190 0.899 1.189 0.900 1.193 0.898
Number of adult female age 15 to 60 1.303 0.917 1.280 0.880 1.339 0.971
Male members age 60 and above 0.116 0.321 0.116 0.320 0.117 0.322
Female members age 60 and above 0.122 0.330 0.130 0.341 0.108 0.311
Land holdings in hectares 0.932 1.742 0.909 1.805 0.968 1.639
Parcel characteristics (restricted to those acquired before the start of the program)
Parcel size in hectares 0.295 0.769 0.289 0.755 0.302 0.785
Number of years possessed 20.280 15.364 20.458 15.751 20.058 14.868
Parcel was purchased 0.407 0.491 0.410 0.492 0.404 0.491
Parcel was inherited 0.388 0.487 0.372 0.484 0.407 0.491⁎⁎⁎
Parcel allocated by government 0.184 0.388 0.186 0.389 0.182 0.386
Acquired through other means 0.021 0.142 0.032 0.175 0.007 0.082⁎⁎⁎
Number of households 2268 1369 886
Number of parcels 5365 2976 2389
Note: Signiﬁcance levels are reported for t-tests of the equality of the means for each of the variables between control and treatment areas.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Many countries have adopted innovative laws to allow recording to
protect land users against this.1 However, partly due to the high
cost and a lack of clear evidence on beneﬁts, measures to implement
these have lagged behind.
If rights are insecure or ill-deﬁned, adjudication and ﬁrst-time
registration processes enjoying legal recognition and backed by
local consent as well as state enforcement can, in principle, reduce
the risk of land loss and spur land-related investment. The magni-
tude and distribution of beneﬁts will depend on the reduction in
enforcement effort formal recognition affords, the increment in se-
curity it provides (a function of legality and legitimacy and of
existing arrangements and existing dispute levels) and the availabil-
ity of investment opportunities. Beneﬁts will be larger if such ar-
rangements enjoy wide legitimacy, provide a large increase in
tenure security, if large resources had earlier been expended on ef-
forts to secure rights or conﬂict, if formalization involves recognition
of rights by groups (e.g., women or migrants) previously excluded,
and if the scope for improving land use, through either land-related
investment or transfers, is high.
The literature highlights cases where interventions to increase
tenure security had positive investment and distributional impacts. In
Peru, receipt of titles allowed former squatters, especially women, to
join formal labor markets instead of staying at home to guard their
land, thereby increasing their income and reducing child labor (Field,
2007). In Vietnam, awarding certiﬁcates prompted higher investment
in perennials and let households, especially poor ones, spend more
time on non-agricultural activities (Do and Iyer, 2008). Titles that
include women in Argentina are also credited with having helped to re-
duce fertility and increase investment in children's human capital
(Galiani and Schargrodsky, 2004) although impacts arise via invest-
ment in physical and human capital rather than credit access (Galiani
and Schargrodsky, 2010).1 These have received backing at the highest political level (African Union, 2009).While unlocking investment is contingent on increased tenure secu-
rity, realizing gains from transferring land to more productive uses
beyond community boundaries requires that, in addition to property
rights being clearly deﬁned, reliable information on them is widely
available and can be accessed at low cost. The conceptual basis for the
credit effects of land titling is that that immobility and indestructibility
make land ideal collateral, but also that it is costly for banks to deter-
minewhether plots offered as collateral can be accepted.2 A reliable reg-
istry that makes complete, current, and authoritative information on a
range of property rights available to interested users can dramatically
reduce the cost of such enquiry, making it possible to exchange land
in impersonal markets and widely use it to secure loans (de Soto,
2000). If credit market imperfections are not too severe and a range of
agricultural and non-agricultural land use options are available, this
can facilitate transfers of land to itsmost productive use and spur devel-
opment of a ﬁnancial system.
Compared to strong empirical support for investment impacts, evi-
dence of credit effects from land titling, though not entirely missing
(Feder et al., 1988), is limited. While measures to improve access to
existing records that providedmuch less security than titles did increase
urban credit access in India (Deininger and Goyal, 2012), the expected
beneﬁts from property rights reform through credit access often failed
to materialize in Peru (Field and Torero, 2006) or accrued only to the
wealthy in Paraguay (Carter and Olinto, 2003). One reason is that, to
help lenders registry information needs to be reasonably complete,
but it takes time for a registry to attain full coverage and reputation.
Also, improved access to information on land ownership will affect
credit supply only if other impediments are absent, i.e., agents have
been credit constrained before and are endowed with sufﬁcient levels
of illiquid wealth that can be foreclosed upon at low cost (Besley and
Ghatak, 2010) and, of course, that the credit market itself is reasonably
well functioning.2 In general, this would require physical inspection and inquiry with neighbors to en-
sure that there are no other ownership claims and some form of a registry to ensure that
the land has not already been pledged as a security for other transactions.
3 As a rule of thumb, the cost of survey increases exponentially with precision (Dale and
Mclaughlin, 2000).
4 This pattern is also found outside of Africa: evenwhere land titling had generated sig-
niﬁcant investment beneﬁts as in Argentina, high cost of formalizing transactions
prompted a process of ‘deregularization’ that eroded the sustainability of these beneﬁts
(Galiani, 2011). Lack of attention to costs alsomade broad coveragewith a sustainable sys-
tem of land registration impossible in the Philippines (Maurer and Iyer, 2008).
Table 4
Outcome variables by treatment status.
Source: Own computation from 2010World Bank Land Tenure Regularization Survey
Total Control Treatment
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Expropriation risk
Perceived risk of expropriation (1 if medium and above risk out of a 5 scale measure) 0.846 0.361 0.859 0.348 0.827 0.378⁎⁎⁎
Perceived risk of expropriation (5 scale measure: 5 = very high risk, 1 = very low risk) 4.061 1.146 4.090 1.068 4.021 1.248⁎⁎⁎
Soil conservation measures between 2007 and 2010
Change in construction of new conservation structures 0.066 0.430 0.042 0.424 0.098 0.435⁎⁎⁎
Change in maintenance of existing structures 0.089 0.366 0.073 0.355 0.110 0.378⁎⁎⁎
New/maintenance of existing structures in 2010 0.315 0.465 0.294 0.456 0.344 0.475⁎⁎⁎
Change in new/maintenance of existing structures 0.140 0.510 0.101 0.499 0.193 0.520⁎⁎⁎
Changed seed from local to improved variety 0.529 0.499 0.498 0.500 0.571 0.495⁎⁎⁎
Land and credit market participation between 2007 and 2010a
Land market participation in 2010 0.161 0.367 0.176 0.381 0.137 0.344⁎⁎
Change in land market (sales/purchases) participation 0.011 0.498 0.022 0.511 −0.008 0.477
Size of land traded in 2010 0.054 0.306 0.059 0.324 0.046 0.275
Change in the size of land traded in hectares 0.005 0.421 0.021 0.380 −0.020 0.477⁎⁎
Access to credit in 2010 0.098 0.298 0.101 0.301 0.094 0.292
Change in access to credit from all sources 0.063 0.272 0.058 0.266 0.070 0.281
Female land ownership and inheritance
Female head/spouse jointly or alone owns parcel 0.869 0.338 0.879 0.326 0.855 0.353⁎⁎⁎
Share of parcel owned by female (%) 42.486 27.400 42.028 27.120 43.112 27.770
Know who will inherit the parcel 0.638 0.481 0.596 0.491 0.695 0.461⁎⁎⁎
Sons will inherit land 0.741 0.438 0.718 0.450 0.767 0.423⁎⁎⁎
Daughters will inherit land 0.690 0.463 0.661 0.474 0.723 0.448⁎⁎⁎
Spouse will inherit parcel 0.321 0.467 0.343 0.475 0.291 0.455⁎⁎⁎
Children will inherit parcel 0.763 0.425 0.719 0.449 0.821 0.383⁎⁎⁎
Number of parcels 6327 3634 2693
Note: Signiﬁcance levels are reported for t-tests of the equality of the means for each of the variables between control and treatment areas.
a Household level outcome variables.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Positive impacts from initiatives to formalize land tenure in other
parts of the world contrast with evidence from Africa where such ef-
forts have often ended in failure or irrelevance (Pinckney and
Kimuyu, 1994). One reason for this is that expectations of credit
effects were often exaggerated: in the absence of relatively complete
and well-functioning land registries providing information about all
rights to a land parcel and rules to make foreclosure threats credible,
credit market effects from land registration are unlikely to material-
ize. In situations where most land is unregistered, land tenure regu-
larization is more likely to affect perceived tenure security, land-
related investment, and allocation of land rights among individuals
within households, but not the credit supply. A second reason is
that efforts to systematically register land in African countries tend
to be derailed by three factors, namely (i) ignorance of distributional
and political economy issues; (ii) failure to recognize a diversity
of approaches and build on existing systems; and (iii) use of approaches
too costly to be sustained.
First, although interventions to recognize land rights can make
everyone better off in principle, they easily degenerate into a zero-
sum game whereby powerful and well-informed individuals use
privileged access to information to regularize land that does not actually
belong to them or to speculatively acquire land in strategic locations at
lowprices (Peters, 2004).While publicity and transparent processes can
help address this at an operational level, gaps in the legal and institu-
tional framework which often result from the inability to reconcile
conﬂicting interests by different stakeholder groups (Boone, 2007),
have in many cases undermined the scope for quick implementation
or, formalization-induced loss of land by secondary right holders such
as migrants or women in informal or polygamous unions.Second, Africa is characterized by legal pluralism and coexistence of
different types of customary tenure and statutory law, each of which
builds on a large system of norms. Expectations of a linear progression
between these or a wholesale replacement of traditional by modern
ones are highly unrealistic (Platteau, 1996). Failure to appreciate varia-
tion across space or to build on well-functioning elements in existing
systems has often contributed to the emergence of parallel systems
(Easterly, 2008), the maintenance of which is complex and costly. As
long as customary systems offer advantages such as low cost and ﬂexi-
bility (Baland and Francois, 2005) which formal legal equivalents ﬁnd
difﬁcult to match, this has frequently resulted in abandonment of the
latter (Atwood, 1990).
Finally, efforts to register land or keep registries up to date will be
socially desirable only if beneﬁts, e.g., from investment, efﬁciency-
enhancing transfers, and conﬂict avoidance exceed the cost. Beyond rou-
tine registry operation, a critical component of the cost of recording land
rights relates to boundary demarcation. As many observers mistakenly
equate high-precision boundary surveys with greater security of rights,
interventions often spend large sums in this area (Burns, 2007).3 This
can easily render land registration uneconomical, as in Madagascar
where beneﬁts from titling, while signiﬁcant and positive, were well
below the cost of acquiring documentation in an inefﬁcient system
(Jacoby and Minten, 2007).4
5 Womenwithout children lost use rights to family land unless theymaintained family
ties by marrying one of their late husband's brothers (Republic of Rwanda, 2004).
6 In 2011, the NLC was integrated into the Rwanda Natural Resource Authority (RNRA)
as the Department of Land and Mapping.
7 Rwanda has ﬁve levels of local administration. It is divided into four provinces (North,
South, East andWest) and the city of Kigali, 30 districts (of which three are within Kigali),
416 sectors, 2146 cells, and 14,876 villages (umudugudu). Roles and responsibilities of
each of them are clearly deﬁned (Republic of Rwanda, 2007) as follows: Provinces are a li-
aison “for coordinating district development planning with the national policies and pro-
grams” and supervise implementation at district level. Districts are responsible for “local
economic development planning and coordinating delivery of public services”. Sectors as-
sume a coordinating role in the delivery of public services and gather data and informa-
tion. Cells prioritize needs and mobilize the community help address them. Villages
have no speciﬁc administrative functions.
Table 5
Estimates of the Impact of LTR on perceived risk of expropriation.
Binary measure Five scale measure
Spatial ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator −0.047 −0.204
(0.997) (1.251)
Treatment × female headship −0.042 −0.106
(0.512) (0.478)
Female headed household −0.066 −0.231⁎
(1.444) (1.653)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator −0.024⁎ −0.079⁎⁎
(1.934) (2.019)
Treatment × female headship −0.039 −0.113
(1.420) (1.355)
Female headed household −0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.242⁎⁎⁎
(3.989) (4.483)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
(500 m from cell boundary)
Treatment indicator −0.059⁎⁎⁎ −0.201⁎⁎⁎
(4.198) (4.523)
Treatment × female headship −0.030 −0.111
(0.943) (1.155)
Female headed household −0.097⁎⁎⁎ −0.350⁎⁎⁎
(4.414) (5.311)
Number of observations (parcels) 5345 5345
Number of observations (b500 m) 4144 4144
Note: All regressions include parcel characteristics (size, number of years possessed and
mode of acquisition) and household level characteristics (demographic controls for
children and adults disaggregated by gender and head's age and educational status). The
geographical neighborhood of each household in Panel A is deﬁned at a distance of
1000 m. Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 m). In
Panels B and C, absolute values of robust t-statistics are given in parenthesis. The sample
in Panel C includes households located less than 500 m from the treatment cell boundary.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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As the most densely populated country in Africa, Rwanda has long
faced the challenge of establishing a land system that would provide
incentives for investment and rational land use to create economic
opportunities while at the same time overcoming gender and ethnic
biases in land access. A failure to meet these challenges has been identi-
ﬁed as contributing to the 1994 genocide. Since then, considerable
efforts have been made to clarify land rights and provide the basis for
overcoming traditional biases, culminating in the LTR program that is
to be evaluated here.
3.1. The challenges posed by land scarcity and conﬂict
With the highest population density in Africa (384 inhabitants/km2
overall and 526/km2 of agricultural land) and some 85% of the popula-
tion having agriculture as their main income source, effective land use
and investment in land are key for poverty reduction in Rwanda
(Republic of Rwanda, 2009). In 2008, the average household had only
0.72 ha of land, below the threshold of 0.75 ha estimated to be neces-
sary to satisfy a family's subsistence with available technology. Rapid
population growth led to fragmentation and created severe environ-
mental challenges by causing farmers to push into marginal lands,
clear forests, and cultivate steep hillsides without proper soil and
water conservation (Republic of Rwanda, 2004).
As in other African countries, customary land tenure systemshad tra-
ditionally provided high levels of tenure security. However, land scarcity
and population pressure failed to trigger institutional innovation to
encourage investment andmore intensive land use. Instead competition
for land in a context of slow expansion of non-agricultural income
opportunities resulted in illegal land sales, pervasive land disputes, and
‘land grabbing’ that exacerbated inequality, landlessness, and socialtensions.Misuse, e.g., by state representatives invoking eminent domain
for private beneﬁt, further weakened the system and its ability to cope
with social, economic and political changes. Land conﬂict has been iden-
tiﬁed as one contributor to the 1994 genocide (Andre and Platteau,
1998) and land policy is widely recognized to have a central role in
creating preconditions for sustained growth and conﬂict prevention
in today's Rwanda. To address this, the country embarked on a series
of legal and institutional reforms, the pilots evaluated here, and
eventually a nation-wide implementation of the land tenure regular-
ization program.
3.2. Legal and institutional changes
To provide secure land tenure to all Rwandans and create precondi-
tions for structural transformation, a set of legal and institutional changes
were embarked upon. Women in Rwanda formerly had land use rights
only through their husbands' lineage so that widows were unable to in-
herit their deceased husband's property and at most allowed to use it
until male children grew up.5 The 1999 inheritance law, key provisions
of which were incorporated into the 2003 constitution, aimed to elimi-
nate such gender bias in three respects. First, daughters and sons are
granted equal rights to inherit parental property. Second, subject to the
family law (which under the conjugal property regime mandates equal
shares), property rights by women in a legally registered marriage are
protected. Third, spousal consent is required for transfer of matrimonial
property by any of the marriage partners.
After animated debate, the 2004 Land Policy put forward general
principles for efﬁcient and sustainable use of scarce land resources. It
was codiﬁed in the 2005 Organic Land Law (OLL) that provides the
legal basis and creates institutional structures for accessible land admin-
istration at national and local levels. One of its key provisions is to estab-
lish a single statutory system of land tenure that vests land ownership
with the state and provides users with long-term usufruct rights (up
to 99 years, depending on land use) that can be sold, passed on to
heirs, mortgaged, leased, or otherwise transferred. The law prohibits
sub-division of agricultural land parcels less than 1 ha; requires approv-
al for any subdivision of parcels between 1 and 5 ha; and lays the basis
for land expropriation (with compensation) in the public interest.
The OLL recognizes customarily acquired land and makes ﬁrst-time
registration and recording of follow up transfers compulsory. The Na-
tional Land Center (NLC)6 was formed as the technical agency in charge
with national and district land commissions providing oversight.7 At the
district, town, and municipality level, District Land Bureaux (DLBs) are
responsible for land administration and land use planning. They are
complemented by land committees at sector and cell levels which
serve as focal points for land registration and land use planning to facil-
itate decentralized and participatory OLL implementation.
3.3. The national land tenure regularization (LTR) program
The program of land tenure regularization (LTR) aims to clarify
rights on all of the country's estimated 10 million land parcels as a pre-
condition for their formalization and full legal recognition, manifested
Table 6
Estimates of the impact of LTR on rural investment.
Change in improved seed use Change in soil conservation measures
New or maintenance New construction Maintenance
Spatial ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator 0.064 0.099⁎⁎ 0.075 0.038
(1.008) (2.460) (1.544) (1.271)
Treatment × female headship 0.003 0.094⁎⁎ 0.026 0.050
(0.076) (2.076) (0.713) (1.314)
Female headed household −0.052⁎ −0.044 −0.040 −0.003
(1.668) (1.183) (1.144) (0.094)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator 0.068⁎⁎⁎ 0.070⁎⁎⁎ 0.048⁎⁎⁎ 0.028⁎⁎
(4.486) (4.431) (3.640) (2.413)
Treatment × female headship 0.006 0.102⁎⁎⁎ 0.034 0.052⁎⁎
(0.180) (3.282) (1.338) (2.155)
Female headed household −0.059⁎⁎ −0.059⁎⁎ −0.049⁎⁎ −0.010
(2.532) (2.526) (2.472) (0.536)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects (500 m from cell boundary)
Treatment indicator 0.085⁎⁎⁎ 0.078⁎⁎⁎ 0.057⁎⁎⁎ 0.029⁎⁎
(5.042) (4.424) (3.933) (2.201)
Treatment × female headship −0.000 0.095⁎⁎⁎ 0.029 0.042
(0.001) (2.687) (1.000) (1.519)
Female headed household −0.056⁎⁎ −0.032 −0.034 0.012
(2.045) (1.140) (1.408) (0.529)
Number of observations (parcels) 6325 6325 6325 6325
Number of observations (b500 m) 4920 4920 4920 4920
Note: All regressions include parcel characteristics (size, number of years possessed andmode of acquisition) and household level characteristics (demographic controls for children and
adults disaggregated by gender and head's age and educational status). The geographical neighborhoodof each household in Panel A is deﬁned at a distance of 1000 m. Absolute value of t-
statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 m). In Panels B and C, absolute values of robust t-statistics are given in parenthesis. The sample in Panel C includes households located less
than 500 m from the treatment cell boundary.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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2010).8 Given the lack of successful precedents, a 2007/2008 pilot in 4
cells covering 14,908 parcels with an area of 3448 ha, owned by 3513
households was implemented to help develop and ﬁne tune the meth-
odology and is the subject of our evaluation.
Fig. 1 displays the location of pilot sectorswhile Table 1 characterizes
the 4 cells chosen to reﬂect the country's diverse land tenure (Republic
of Rwanda, 2008). Kabushinge cell represents a high population density
rural area (769 persons/km2) in the North where population pressure,
land scarcity, and conﬂict arising from high levels of polygamy and
post-genocide land allocation to refugees and soldiers were prevalent.
Biguhu, in the West (337 persons/km2), represents genocide-affected
areas with many female household heads and orphan landholders.
Mwoga, in a low-density sector (274 persons/km2) features extensive
land sharing and a high concentration of refugees. Nyamugali is a dense-
ly populated peri-urban area (3500 inhabitants per km2) in Kigali city in
the midst of the transformation from agricultural to residential use.
There, thriving informal land markets and high levels of expropriation
risk, created demand for legalization of land records.
The key steps of the LTR process are documented in a manual that
sets out procedures for implementation of LTR by mobile teams in
campaign-style (Republic of Rwanda Ofﬁce of the Registrar of Land
Titles, 2009). After the declaration of an area as subject to adjudication
and conduct of a stakeholder sensitization programs, locally trained
para-surveyors demarcate parcel boundaries in the ﬁeld in the presence
of land owners and all adjoining neighbors, mark them on an aerial
photo to create a parcel index map and, for undisputed parcels,9 and8 As is usual in programs of this nature, LTR aims to formalize rights to land already pos-
sessed by land users.
9 Parcels, the ownership claims to which are disputed, are to be recorded in a separate
dispute register. Disputed claims can then be pursued separately through either adminis-
trative or judicial channels with the possibility of legal NGOs playing an important role in
moving the process along.issue a claim receipt. This receipt contains the names of all persons,
including women and minors, with a claim or interest in the property
and is signed by the land holder and neighbors. Information from the
receipt is transcribed to a registry book, digitized in the central ofﬁce,
and together with the parcel index map, displayed publicly. If no objec-
tions are raisedwithin a public display period of at least 2 weeks, the in-
formation is formally registered, allowing award of a formal certiﬁcate
upon payment of a nominal fee.10
4. Sampling, econometric approach, and data
While the trials present a number of interesting aspects, a keymeth-
odological challenge for a rigorous socio-economic assessment of the
pilots was the lack of baseline data. To deal with this, we adopt a spatial
discontinuity design and administered a short survey containing some
questions that ask for recall at the start of the program to some 3500
households on both sides of the boundaries of the four pilot cells. This
section describes the sample design and the econometric methodology.
4.1. Sampling strategy
In the absence of a usable baseline survey,we exploit the discontinu-
ity created by pilot cell boundaries as our identiﬁcation strategy. In
other words, we rely on cross-sectional data, sampled from a narrow
band on both sides of the pilot cell borders to assess program impacts.
A survey administered in April–May 2010, about 2.5 years after the
start of LTR, was used to obtain information for 3554 households with
some 6330 parcels. The sample was to be distributed equally on both
sides of the pilot cell boundary to create a treatment group (within10 The fee is RWF 1000 (US$ 1.84 at the 2008 rate) per parcel or about RWF 4000 (US$
7.36) per household taking the national average of four parcels per household. This
compares to a cost of approximately US$ 9–11 in the pilot – since then reduced to about
US$ 5 – per parcel.
12 This approach extends work comparing enterprises on either side of a state border in
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program cells). Parcel index maps created by the program were used
to sample within pilot cells. For adjacent (control) cells, we used high
resolution satellite imagery to visually identify dwellings that could
then serve as a sample frame. Fig. 2 illustrates the procedure graphically
for one of the cells. To ensure that the share of households in each pilot
cell corresponded to the cell's share in the pilot population, thewidth of
the band fromwhich householdswere selected is cell-speciﬁc.11 Also, as
we lack power for robust conclusions on the urban sample (i.e., the city
of Kigali), the analysis in this paper is solely based on data from rural
areas.
Table 1 shows the distribution of sampled households in the pilot
and their adjacent cells. Information was collected both at household
and parcel levels. Household level information includes demographics,
housing, assets, participation in the credit market, participation in the
registration programand knowledge of the lawand theGPS coordinates
of themain residential plot. Parcel level questions included land charac-
teristics, investment, inheritance dynamics as well as participation in
land sales and rental markets.
4.2. Econometric approach
To examine the effects of LTR, we estimate the following equation:
Yph ¼ αþ β1Tph þ β2Xph þ β3Zh þ εph ð1Þ
where Yph is the outcome of interest for parcel p in household h, T is an
indicator for LTR participation, X is a vector of parcel characteristics, Z11 Outer and inner bandwidths were 125 m in Nyamugali, 400 m in Kabushinge, 350 m
in Biguhu, and 1250 m in Mwoga.household characteristics, and ε an error term. As this is not an experi-
mental design, unobservable characteristics that are present in the
registered areas could be driving impacts rather than titling per se and
β1 can be interpreted as the impact of the LTR program only if this pos-
sibility can be excluded.Wewill not be able to exclude the possibility of
unobserved characteristics or programs affecting the results but lay out
very clearlywhywe think this is not the case and leave it to the reader to
decide on the plausibility of our argument.
First, under Rwanda's LTR program, registration was compulsory for
all parcels in the cells, in contrast to other land registration programs
where the voluntary nature of registration introduces selection bias
that further complicates the evaluation problem. Second, to maximize
the probability that households in treatment and control cells are as
similar as possible, we draw our sample from narrow bands on either
side of cell borders, as indicated above.
As tenure regularization was compulsory but limited to (private)
land in the cell, we can use the spatial discontinuity generated in this
way to identify pilot program effects by comparing individuals who
live within a band on either side of the border following Magruder
(2011).12 For the validity of this approach, communities on either side
of the border have to be identical and other cell-level effects that
could drive results must be absent. One speciﬁc concern is that cell
level policies (or cell level enforcement of national or district policy)
may affect outcomes independent of land registration. However, key
policies relating to land rights and use are set and enacted by higher
levels of government; for example land inheritancepolicy is determinedthe US to look at the effects of minimumwage legislation (Card and Krueger, 1994) to ex-
plore effects of centralized bargaining agreements on employment using geographic and
labor force data.
13 Unfortunately, households in treatment cells have only 6% of their parcels located out-
side the treatment cells; a number is too small to allow identiﬁcation of program effects
fromwithin-household ﬁxed effect estimation. In the results reported below, we use only
parcels located in a households' cell of residence. All the regressions were also run exclud-
ing households with land parcels outside their cell of residence. Results, which are avail-
able on request, do not differ substantively from those reported below.
14 These results are robust to a linear speciﬁcation (available on request). Our data set,
however, will not support higher order polynomials.
15 Note that for all regressions results with district ﬁxed effects are substantively similar
and can be obtained from the authors upon request.
Table 7
Estimates of the impact of LTR on female land rights (married couples only).
Owns land Share of land owned
Spatial ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator −0.090⁎⁎⁎ −0.424
(2.747) (0.215)
Treatment × marriage certiﬁcate 0.157⁎⁎⁎ 3.988
(2.856) (1.140)
Has marriage certiﬁcate 0.083⁎⁎⁎ 3.027⁎
(2.958) (1.828)
Asset index −0.003 −0.734
(0.524) (1.452)
Treatment × Asset index 0.015⁎⁎ 1.087⁎
(2.041) (1.694)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator −0.165⁎⁎⁎ −6.675⁎⁎⁎
(5.920) (4.460)
Treatment × marriage certiﬁcate 0.167⁎⁎⁎ 7.257⁎⁎⁎
(6.025) (4.813)
Has marriage certiﬁcate 0.076⁎⁎⁎ 3.007⁎⁎⁎
(4.782) (3.470)
Asset index −0.001 −0.345
(0.260) (1.290)
Treatment × asset index 0.010⁎⁎ 0.973⁎⁎⁎
(2.009) (3.054)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
(500 m from cell boundary)
Treatment indicator −0.115⁎⁎⁎ −1.893
(3.558) (1.085)
Treatment × marriage certiﬁcate 0.127⁎⁎⁎ 2.854⁎
(4.032) (1.654)
Has marriage certiﬁcate 0.104⁎⁎⁎ 5.564⁎⁎⁎
(5.125) (5.180)
Asset index 0.004 −0.306
(0.835) (0.940)
Treatment × asset index 0.006 0.834⁎⁎
(0.996) (2.228)
Number of observations (individuals) 4609 4608
Number of observations (b500 m) 3549 3548
Note: All regressions include parcel characteristics (size, number of years possessed and
mode of acquisition) and household level characteristics (demographic controls for
children and adults disaggregated by gender and head's age and educational status). The
geographical neighborhood of each household in Panel A is deﬁned at a distance of
1000 m. Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 m). In
Panels B and C, absolute values of robust t-statistics are given in parenthesis. The sample
in Panel C includes households located less than 500 m from the treatment cell boundary.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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district level. Cell level administrations lack authority to make decisions
on resource allocation that could affect observed outcomes in trial cells,
but play a role in sensitization, conﬂict resolution, display, and registra-
tion, all of which are part of the treatment. Nonetheless, we cannot rule
out the possibility that the government of the cells which received the
registration intervention took it upon themselves to encourage invest-
ment, for example. We will return to this issue below with some other
evidence, but the concern will remain.
Third, we might still be concerned about the possibility of local
variations in soil quality, market conditions or other factors that could
drive our results. To address this, we follow the literature (Conley and
Udry, 2010; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Magruder, 2011) and use spatial
ﬁxed effects to control for local level unobservables. Eq. (1) now
becomes:
Yph−
1
Np
X
q∈Np
Yph ¼ β1ðTph− 1Np Xq∈Np TphÞþ β2ðXph− 1Np Xq∈Np XphÞ
þβ3ðZh− 1Np Xq∈Np ZhÞþ εph− 1Np Xq∈Np εh
ð2Þwhere Np is both the set of parcels within a critical distance of parcel p
and the number of such parcels. In other words, Eq. (2) offers a contin-
uous way to compare treatment and control households so that each
household is compared to those in a neighborhood (some literally
next door) which are some combination of treatment and control
households. To increase the likelihood of comparing similar households,
we interviewed all households in the band spanning to the cell border
(i.e., inside and outside). While this approach will give us only a local
treatment effect, it is well-suited for spatial ﬁxed estimations by de-
livering a high density of treatment and control households in close
proximity to one another. As we lack information on parcel location,
we deﬁne the critical distance as a neighborhood of households. To
ensure we capture all parcels and each treatment (control)
household's neighborhood contains at least one control (treatment)
household for comparison, we deﬁned this critical distance as
1000 m.13 In order to deal with possible spatial autocorrelations in
the error term, we follow Conley (1999) to correct the standard
errors. Finally, as a way to check the robustness of these results, we
also present results using explicit controls for the geographic loca-
tion of the household following Dell (2010). Following Dell, we esti-
mate an equation of the following form:
Yph ¼ αþ β1Tph þ β2Xph þ β3Zh þ f geographic locationð Þ þ ϕb
þ εph ð3Þ
where terms are deﬁned as above and ϕb is a boundary ﬁxed effect.
As opposed to the spatial ﬁxed effects estimator discussed above,
this approach introduces continuous controls for where households
are in space through the explicit introduction of geographic coordi-
nates. To implement this, we use a quadratic14 polynomial of latitude
and longitude to capture geographic location. In addition, in order to
capture local conditions, we use pairwise ﬁxed effects for a given
treatment cell and its adjacent control cells (since each treatment
cell borders on more than one control cell) represented by boundary
ﬁxed effects above. Finally, as an additional argument supporting our
investment-related results we present the estimates of kernel-
weighted local polynomial regressions over distance to the boundary
to examine the potential change in effects at the boundary.5. Descriptive data and econometric results
This section presents a comparison of treatment and control cells
for key variables to lend empirical support to the validity of our
identiﬁcation assumptions, descriptive data, and econometric
results. For the latter, we report three speciﬁcations, namely (i) a
regression with spatial ﬁxed effects, (ii) a speciﬁcation including a
quadratic polynomial of the latitude–longitude coordinates for the
household following Eq. (3) above for the entire sample, and (iii)
in order to examine the robustness of results to amore narrow inter-
pretation of the local treatment effect, the same speciﬁcation with
the sample restricted to households located within 500 m of the
treatment cell boundary.15
Table 8
Estimates of the impact of LTR on inheritance dynamics.
Know who will inherit Children inherit Son inherits Daughter inherits
Spatial ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator 0.094⁎⁎ 0.133⁎⁎ 0.102⁎⁎ 0.096⁎⁎
(2.186) (2.276) (2.552) (2.039)
Treatment × Female headship −0.044 −0.046 −0.052 −0.158⁎⁎
(0.741) (0.779) (0.735) (2.326)
Female headed household 0.071⁎ 0.094⁎⁎⁎ 0.210⁎⁎⁎ −0.003
(1.789) (3.003) (5.764) (0.062)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator 0.121⁎⁎⁎ 0.112⁎⁎⁎ 0.063⁎⁎⁎ 0.089⁎⁎⁎
(8.763) (9.145) (4.063) (5.357)
Treatment × female headship −0.054⁎ −0.040⁎ −0.016 −0.132⁎⁎⁎
(1.913) (1.648) (0.541) (4.033)
Female headed household 0.073⁎⁎⁎ 0.094⁎⁎⁎ 0.198⁎⁎⁎ −0.023
(3.322) (4.808) (8.818) (0.903)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects (500 m from cell boundary)
Treatment indicator 0.095⁎⁎⁎ 0.114⁎⁎⁎ 0.087⁎⁎⁎ 0.097⁎⁎⁎
(6.181) (8.200) (5.012) (5.188)
Treatment × female headship −0.066⁎⁎ −0.068⁎⁎ 0.024 −0.127⁎⁎⁎
(2.112) (2.419) (0.724) (3.420)
Female headed household 0.098⁎⁎⁎ 0.123⁎⁎⁎ 0.177⁎⁎⁎ −0.020
(3.831) (5.254) (6.745) (0.673)
Number of observations (parcels) 6325 6325 4053 4053
R2 0.018 0.057 0.345 0.057
Note: All regressions include parcel characteristics (size, number of years possessed and mode of acquisition) and household level characteristics (demographic controls for children
and adults disaggregated by gender and head's age and educational status). The geographical neighborhood of each household in Panel A is deﬁned at a distance of 1000 m. Absolute
value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 m). In Panels B and C, absolute values of robust t-statistics are given in parenthesis. The sample in Panel C includes households
located less than 500 m from the treatment cell boundary.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Althoughdiscussionswith the project staff suggest that trial cellswere
selected because of the prevalence of key problems rather than a desire to
cherry-pick and show success,16 as argued above, it is conceivable that of-
ﬁcials in trial cells may have been particularly eager to enforce govern-
ment policies or that being chosen for the trial prompted them to exert
extra effort to ensure compliance with other government policies such
as soil conservation for reasons unrelated to the intervention at hand.
While we cannot observe this directly, we compare descriptive data on
enforcement of other priority government programs (prohibition of po-
lygamy and primary education) prior to the trials as well as substantive
legal knowledge for treatment and control samples to shed light on
potential differences in policy enforcement across the cells.
The top panel of Table 2 presents data on the share of females who
acted in contravention of the law by entering into polygamous mar-
riages after the law prohibiting such arrangements took effect in 1999,
as well as the share of children of different ages enrolled in the grade
which is appropriate for their age in primary school. We use these as
measures of the extent towhich cell leaders compliedwith national pol-
icies (monogamy and education) before and during the start of LTR im-
plementation. The failure to ﬁnd any signiﬁcant difference between
treatment and control cells in these variables makes it unlikely that
treatment cells were chosen because they had leaders whowere excep-
tionally willing or able to enforce compliance with government policies
overall.1716 Clive English, personal communication. The rationale for selecting cells representing
broader issues was that in this way the pilot would provide solutions to be scaled up to
the rest of the country or convince authorities that a national program was unattainable
without further preparation.
17 Arguably, the program could have impacted these variables. However, the lack of any
clear pattern in grade for age, which is a cumulativemeasure, suggests that this is not like-
ly to be the case.Onemight still argue that the attention associatedwith the trials and
the interest in making LTR a success at the highest political level may
have sent a signal to cell ofﬁcials to take action or put pressure on
households to make the trials a success. We use legal measures of
knowledge from amultiple choice test administered as part of our ques-
tionnaire (see Appendix A for wording of questions and responses), to
check one possible measure of this hypothesis. The bottom panel of
Table 2 suggests variation in households' awareness of relevant legal
provisions that is of interest in its own right.18 Importantly for us,
legal knowledge on key topics is never higher, and in some cases signif-
icantly lower in treatment compared to control cells. Thus ofﬁcials in
trial cells failed to take measures to improve households' awareness of
legal provisions about their land rights that are essential for the success
of LTR in the long term. If they were unable to increase households'
knowledge of key aspects of land legislation, the notion of trial cell
ofﬁcials having suddenly started to selectively enforce policies that are
unrelated to the main thrust of LTR seems highly unlikely. However, it
is important to note again that these are indirect measures and that,
while we think we can make a strong argument, we cannot rule out
the possibility that that ofﬁcials in treatment cells undertook speciﬁc
measures to encourage investment in soil and water conservation dur-
ing or immediately after land tenure regularization. Table 3 presents
summary statistics at household and parcel level by treatment status.
Data suggest signiﬁcant levels of female headship (22%), small land-
holdings (0.93 ha), and formalized marriage in three quarters (76.4%)
of cases. With the exception of female headship, households in treat-
ment and control areas are not statistically different from each other.18 Awareness of the need for written spousal consent and equality among children in
terms of inheritance is very high. Although only about 20% are aware that approval at
higher level is required for expropriation proceedings to go ahead, 60% know that, in case
of expropriation, relocation is contingent on receipt of compensation. By comparison, only
17% know that land that land that is not used can be taken back by government.
Table 9
Estimates of the impact of LTR on land market participation and credit access.
Change in participation Credit access
Spatial ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator −0.048⁎⁎ 0.015
(1.970) (0.882)
Treatment × female headship −0.020 0.030
(0.456) (0.942)
Female headed household −0.002 −0.008
(0.044) (0.414)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
Treatment indicator −0.020 0.011
(0.767) (0.671)
Treatment × female headship −0.016 0.032
(0.335) (1.178)
Female headed household 0.000 −0.010
(0.003) (0.497)
Quadratic polynomial in latitude and longitude with boundary ﬁxed effects
(500 m from cell boundary)
Treatment indicator −0.025 0.002
(0.910) (0.122)
Treatment × female headship −0.019 0.055⁎
(0.373) (1.761)
Female headed household −0.025 −0.010
(0.630) (0.418)
Number of observations (households) 2267 2255
Number of observations (b500 m) 1657 1648
Note: The dependent variable in col. 1 is a categorical variable (−1, 0, 1) indicating the
change in land market participation at the household level between the 3 years
immediately preceding the reform (i.e. 2004–2007) and the 3 years immediately
following it (i.e., 2007–2010). This variable is constructed based on aggregation of parcel
data to the household level.
All regressions include household level characteristics (demographic controls for children
and adults disaggregated by gender and head's age and educational status). The
geographical neighborhood of each household in Panel A is deﬁned at a distance of
1000 m. Absolute value of t-statistics corrected for spatial dependence (1500 m). In
Panels B and C, absolute values of robust t-statistics are given in parenthesis. The sample
in Panel C includes households located less than 500 m from the treatment cell boundary.
⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁎⁎⁎ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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control households received a higher share of parcels by ‘other means’
rather than inheritance.
To give a sense of the magnitudes involved, key outcome variables
are presented in Table 4. While these means suggest large differences
in terms of investment, knowing who will inherit the parcel and the
subjective expropriation risk, all of which could be a result of the pro-
gram, the use of spatial ﬁxed estimates that correct standard errors for
spatial dependence will be required to draw robust conclusions regard-
ing the program's impact. We discuss these variables in the context of
the econometric estimations below.
5.2. Expropriation risk and land related investment
A primary motive for the initiation of LTRwas to enhance incentives
for land-related investment by increasing tenure security.While the risk
of losing land to conﬂict with individuals was impossible to assess,
we asked respondents to rate their perceived risk of expropriation
by the state. Results of estimated program effects on this variable
on a scale measure and a binary indicator derived from it are report-
ed in Table 5.19 While the sign on the treatment coefﬁcient is consis-
tently negative as expected, it is statistically signiﬁcant only in the
polynomial, but not the spatial ﬁxed effects model which we prefer,
as it controls for a range of unobservable variables at the local level.19 The wording of the question was “What is the likelihood that you will lose this parcel
due to expropriation in the coming 5 years” with 1 being very low risk and 5 being very
high risk. The binary index is set to one for anybody indicating some expropriation risk.The lack of signiﬁcancemay be either because LTR did not change ex-
propriation policy or because, as noted above, households' knowl-
edge of relevant procedures changed little or not at all. Results
including the remaining covariates also suggest that households
feel less insecure if they purchased or inherited their land rather
than having received it through government allocation (see the
Appendix A). The interaction between female headship and treat-
ment is insigniﬁcant throughout, suggesting that female heads
were not differentially affected.
Beyondperceptions, LTR-induced increases in tenure security should
manifest themselves in higher investment. As Rwanda is Africa's most
densely populated country, investment in soil conservation is crucial.
In Table 6 we provide result for the impact of the program on soil
conservation as well as another potential measure of investment, the
use of improved seeds.
The coefﬁcient on the use of improved seeds is positive but not sig-
niﬁcant in the spatial ﬁxed effects model, though highly signiﬁcant in
the other two models (col. 1). This is in line with the notion that seeds
yield beneﬁts mainly in the period they are applied. At the same time,
households in the treatment group whose land rights were regularized
are some 10 percentage points more likely to have initiated or main-
tained soil conservation investments in structures such as bunds,
terraces, and check dams (col. 2), about double the change in the inci-
dence of investment in the control group. With a 19 percentage point
increase in the likelihood of measures for soil conservation, the
point estimate for program effects on investment incentives by
female headed households are disproportionately large. A possible
explanation is that tenure insecurity for female heads, often
widows, was particularly large and that such insecurity was at
least partly reduced by registration, leading to increased investment
and, to the extent that such investment translated into economic
beneﬁts, welfare.
Finally, to support the robustness of the overall investment effects,
Fig. 3 shows the results of kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions
for soil and water conservation as a function of distance to the cell
boundary. As can be seen from this ﬁgure, there is a signiﬁcant differ-
ence in the change in the incidence of investment between treatment
and control cells.
5.3. Women's land rights and inheritance
Rwanda's legislation to improve women's access to land and assets
through inheritance is likely to have repercussions in a wide range of
areas, a full exploration of which is beyond the scope of this study.
Still, comparing the extent to which female land ownership is for-
malized and girls are named as inheritors of land between treatment
and control cells allows us to test whether LTR helped advance the
government's female empowerment agenda in a concrete way. For
the sub-sample of married couples, Table 7 displays regressions
with zero/one indicators of land ownership and the share of family
land owned by females as dependent variables. Interestingly, all
speciﬁcations point towards a negative effect of treatment by itself.
This implies that, for women not legally married (i.e., without a mar-
riage certiﬁcate), LTR resulted in a statistically signiﬁcant reduction
(by 9 points in our preferred speciﬁcation) of the probability of
having documented land ownership.20 Such a negative effect on
women married without a certiﬁcate is consistent with a literal
interpretation of the law which denies formal land rights to those
in informal unions.
Women in a union formalized through a marriage certiﬁcate
(76% in our sample) on the other hand, experienced a strong posi-
tive program effect; if our estimates are correct they are on net 720 While our questionnaire did not elicit information on disputed claims, it would in
principle be straightforward to use thedispute register to explore howmany of thesewere
able to register disputed claims and how many of these had actually been resolved.
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after LTR than before. As the likelihood of having a marriage certiﬁ-
cate is positively correlated with wealth, we include a rudimentary
indicator of asset ownership and its interaction with treatment as
a control.21 The result remains robust after controlling for these var-
iables. Spatial ﬁxed effects results using the share of land owned by
women as a dependent variable point to a positive, but statistically
insigniﬁcant program effect regardless of the presence of a marriage
certiﬁcate.
As inheritance to males has often undermined the sustainability of
regularization-induced improvements in females' land rights (Deere
and Leon, 2001), complementing a focus on current land rights with
inheritance is warranted.22 Table 8 suggests that, presumably because
it requires an explicit record ofwhowill inherit a parcel, LTR signiﬁcant-
ly reduced succession-related uncertainty. The respondent's knowledge
of who will inherit land increases by 9 points for the spatial ﬁxed effect
speciﬁcation and slightly more for the polynomial one. Children are
particularly affected; our estimates suggest that with LTR they are
13 points more likely to inherit land. Consistent with legal require-
ments, gender bias was virtually eliminated and girls' planned level
of land inheritance is almost equal to boys' (col. 3 and 4). Of course
such intentions measure the quality of program implementation
rather than actual impact, which would have to be supported by
data on actual inheritance-related transfers that will become avail-
able only over time.
However, inmarked contrast to the evidence of stated intentions fully
in line with the formal law, we ﬁnd a large and negative program impact
on plans to bequeath land to girls in female headed households—the
coefﬁcient on treatment interacted with female headship for daughter's
inheritance is negative and signiﬁcant. One plausible reason for this is
that, in a virilocal exogamous society, transferring land to females
would imply putting one's old age support at risk and that doing so
would be particularly challenging for female heads who may lack other
support mechanisms. Substantively, this illustrates the importance of ex-
pectations about norms in the process of social change and the fact that
such change is unlikely to be a unidirectional process. In the narrower
context of evaluating LTR, the fact that some households managed to ex-
plicitly evade the law provides another piece of evidence to help in eval-
uating our identifying assumption that governments in treatment cells
did not take extra measures to encourage investment (for example).
While this is not in any way direct evidence on the government's actions
on investment, it may provide some suggestive support for the argument
that they focused solely on the process of carrying out registration.5.4. Land market activity and access to credit
The historical importance of distress sales in environments with
factor market imperfections (Kranton and Swamy, 1999) often raises
concerns that, by reducing transaction costs of transferring land, inter-
ventions to improve land tenure may make it easier for ill-informed
households who lack access to credit and insurance to sell off their
land in periods of distress well below its fair market value. Doing so, it
is argued, would make them enter a downward spiral of impoverish-
ment. Data on the mode of acquisition of each parcel, together with
information on all land sales since 2004, allow us to reconstruct the
dynamics of land endowments and land market participation at house-
hold level. Although it will not allow inferences on the impact ofmarket21 In the absence of income or expenditure data, we constructed an asset index using da-
ta on livestock ownership, asset ownership (e.g., radio, bicycle, beds and tables) and hous-
ing characteristics (e.g., number of rooms, roof materials, type of toilets and access to
public services). Principal components analysis is used to summarize the various asset
ownership variables into one-dimensional asset index to proxy for household wealth
(Filmer and Pritchett, 2001).
22 This is also true as beneﬁts from legal reform of inheritance lawdemonstrated in other
contexts (Deininger et al., 2013) can be strengthened if such arrangements are formalized.transactions, this information can be used to provide evidence on the
extent to which, in the case of LTR in Rwanda, program-induced land
market transfersmay have been an issue. To do so, we compare changes
in land market participation, either in terms of a categorical variable for
the net change in land market participation (taking the values of−1, 0,
and 1) or the actual area transacted in the 3 years immediately preced-
ing the reform (i.e., 2004–2007) as compared to the 3 years immediate-
ly following it (i.e., 2007–2010).
Results from regressions for the categorical variable of changes in
land market participation are reported in col. 1 of Table 9. They allow
us to reject the hypothesis of LTR-induced land sales; in fact while the
polynomial speciﬁcations show no signiﬁcant program effect, the
spatial ﬁxed effect equation points towards a statistically signiﬁcant
reduction in landmarket activity.23 To interpret this ﬁnding, two factors
are relevant. First, in early 2008, i.e., during pilot implantation, stamp
duty, which is the fee to be paid upon registration of a transfer, was
changed from 6% of the property value to a ﬂat fee of RwF 20,000
which, for smaller plots, could easily exceed25%of the land value.24 Sec-
ond, at the time of the survey, a formal system to register land transfers
was not yet in place and it was unclear to what extent prohibitions on
registering transfers of parcels below the legal minimum size of 1 ha
would be enforced (which would have affected virtually all the trans-
fers). Households may thus have refrained from land transfers so as to
not jeopardize their tenure security, to avoid registration fees, or to
wait for others to realize the beneﬁts from secure land ownership doc-
umentation. While data from the national roll-out are likely to provide
further insight into this, there is no evidence of program-induced dis-
tress sales.
In a situation where, as in Rwanda at the time of our survey, mort-
gage registration is completely separate from the land registry, no oper-
ational system to register land transactions exists, and registration fees
are prohibitive, ﬁnding a positive credit effect from LTR would be
puzzling and raise more questions than it would answer. Still, the
literature's focus on credit and a desire to explore the robustness of
our results as much as possible motivates us to check for possible credit
effects even though credit access in our sample is very limited overall.
Results from regressions with a change in credit market participation
between 2007 and 2010 shown in col. 2 of Table 9, indeed suggest
that the program did not have a signiﬁcant impact on credit, all coefﬁ-
cients in the regression are insigniﬁcant with the exception of one coef-
ﬁcient in the quadratic polynomial speciﬁcation that is signiﬁcant at
10%. We conclude that, even in Rwanda with one of the highest rates
of land transactions in Africa, expectations of land regularization en-
hancing access to formal credit at any signiﬁcant scale are bound to be
disappointed without signiﬁcant efforts to establish accessible and
low-cost ways to obtain up to date and locally comprehensive informa-
tion on all interests to a given piece of land.25 Providing such informa-
tion is likely to be easier and economically justiﬁed in urban environs
such as Kigali where there is indeed incipient demand for an integrated
land and mortgage registry from the ﬁnancial sector.
6. Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, we examine the potential impacts of land title registra-
tion in Rwanda by comparing households in cells which receive LTR
with their neighbors in cells which did not. To attribute the changes
we observe to the impact of LTR, one has to be convinced that no23 Results for the equivalent regressionswith the change in area traded as the dependent
variable yield substantively equivalent conclusions and are not reported to conserve
space.
24 The new fee structure also required payment of fees (equal to those for sales) in cases
of registering transfers due to inheritance,which had been exempted earlier. In light of the
high levels of land market transactions in Rwanda, this could quickly cause reversion to
informality.
25 Indeed, the registry is necessary but not sufﬁcient for credit to follow. Issues on the de-
mand side could be present as well.
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could be driving the changes we observe. We have provided some sug-
gestive evidence that thismight not be the case, but are unable to direct-
ly rule out this possibility. Hence, our results need to be interpretedwith
this caveat in mind.
On the one hand, our results suggest that LTR addressed key
constraints to environmental protection, agricultural development,
and female empowerment in Rwanda. Individuals whose parcels had
been registered almost doubled investments in soil conservation and
female-headed ones almost tripled it. Legally married women were
signiﬁcantly more likely to have their informal rights documented and
secured. Clariﬁcation and documentation of rights reduced uncertainty
over intended inheritance of land, with substantial beneﬁts for girls.
At the same time, the manifestation of potential beneﬁts is not uni-
versal. While we are not surprised that we are unable to ﬁnd credit
effects, the processes of social and economic change including those
set off by land registration is evident in a number of areas most imme-
diately related to gender. The program led to an erosion of rights by fe-
male spouses who are not legally married, in accordance with legal
provisions but in contravention of informal practice and possibly also
traditional concepts of equity. It prompted female household heads to
deprive daughters of their legally guaranteed rights to inherit land –
or at least declare their intention to do so – thus ignoring the law and
siding with tradition, most likely because of doubts about systems of
old age support that would allow them to conﬁdently transfer land
to girls. Changes in program design can address only some of these
issues,26 supporting the notion that such change is rarely smooth or
linear. With land as a key household asset and population pressure as
well as economic growth increasing land demand in a number of
respects, land regularization efforts offer considerable promise for
research to better understand these processes.
Appendix A. Questions used in the multiple choice test of
legal knowledge
1. Assume that a husband and a wife under community of property
regime have two minor children (a son and a daughter). If the hus-
band were to (god forbid) die, what will happen to the household's
land?
1 = The land will be divided among the spouse and the children
2 = The surviving spouse will administer the land
3 = The land will be divided between the two children
4 = DK
2. If subsequently, (God forbid) the spouse were to die, who would
inherit the land?
1 = The son will inherit the entire land
2 = The son will take all the land but will be required to look after
the daughter until she marries
3 = The daughter will inherit the entire land
4 = The land will be divided equally between the son and the
daughter
5 = DK
3. Assume that a husband and a wife jointly own the land of the house-
hold. Suppose that the wife is temporarily out of the country (living
abroad). Can the husband mortgage or lease the land without the
written consent of his wife?
1 = Yes
2 = No
3 = DK26 For example, the Government has issued instructions to recognize informal marriages
in the LTR process.4. Suppose that a household left a piece of fertile agricultural land
fallow consecutively for three years. Can the land be requisitioned
by government?
1 = Yes
2 = No
3 = DK
5. The Cell Land Committee has approved expropriation of a given piece
of land for public purposes affecting only the cell (e.g. construction of
a public building). Is this sufﬁcient for the project to go ahead?
1 = Yes
2 = No, the approval of the District Land Commission is needed
3 = No, approval of the National Land Commission is needed
4 = DK
6. Assume the necessary approvals have been obtained and compensa-
tion in cash has been determined. The land owner is asked by the
relevant authorities to relocate so that they can pay him the compen-
sation. Should he follow their orders even if he has not yet received
the compensation payment?
1 = Yes, deﬁnitely
2 = Yes, as long as he/she considers the value of compensation to be
fair.
3 = No
4 = DK
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